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Data Expiration, Let the User Decide:
Proposed Legislation for Online User-
Generated Content
By KAREN MAJOVSKI*
Introduction
THE INTERNET REMEMBERS ALL, and for some individuals this
comes at a cost. Take the story of twenty-five-year-old, soon-to-be
schoolteacher Stacy Snyder, whose university denied her a teaching
certificate because of a picture she posted to her MySpace page.1 The
photo depicted the student teacher wearing a pirate hat while holding
a plastic cup with the caption, “drunken pirate.”2 When university offi-
cials learned about the picture, they determined it was improper for a
student teacher to represent herself in that manner.3 As a result, the
university denied Ms. Snyder a teaching certificate.4
Jean-Sun Hannah Ahn, a college student, also fell victim to the
Internet’s perfect digital memory in December 2011.5 Before she en-
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1. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER, DELETE: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age
1, 110 (2009).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Lauren Sher, Miss Seattle Insists She Doesn’t Hate Seattle After Twitter Rant, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/03/miss-seattle-in-
sists-she-doesnt-hate-seattle-after-twitter-rant/ (relating the story of Miss Seattle’s controver-
sial Tweets and her subsequent apology); Louise Boyle, ‘I Can’t Stand Rainy Seattle and the
Annoying People’: Newly-crowned Miss Seattle Apologises After Twitter Rant, MAIL ONLINE
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2111252/Beauty-queen-Miss-Se-
attle-criticises-city-Twitter.html (providing screen-shot photographs of Miss Seattle’s Tweets
in perfect digital form).
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tered and won the Miss Seattle scholarship pageant, she tweeted that
she was “seriously . . . hating Seattle right now” and wanted to be taken
“back to [Arizona]!!!” because “[u]gh” she could not “stand cold rainy
Seattle and the annoying people.”6 After Ahn was crowned Miss Seat-
tle in March 2012, a Seattle reporter disclosed her tweets to the pub-
lic.7 This report inspired local and national criticism for the pageant
winner on television, radio, in news articles and blog commentary.8
Seattle radio personality, Linda Thomas, remarked that “[o]n her
Twitter feed, [Miss Seattle] frequently uses the word ‘annoyed,’ so
perhaps it’s just her favorite word. [Miss Seattle] should reconsider
the way [she] uses social media if she wants to be a public figure.”9
Even though Ms. Ahn later deleted her controversial tweets, they still
remain in perfect permanent digital form on the Internet through
copies, on blogs, and in articles discussing the incident.10 The In-
ternet’s permanent digital memory will associate the tweets and com-
mentary with Ms. Ahn for the rest of her life. Thus, “far from giving us
a new sense of control over the face we present to the world, the In-
ternet is shackling us to everything that we have ever said, or that any-
one has said about us.”11
For both Stacy Snyder and Miss Seattle 2012, the Internet
remembered what both wanted to forget. Stories like these are becom-
ing more common. It is becoming harder for users to separate them-
selves from online content that negatively affects their offline work
life, personal life, school life, and, for Miss Seattle 2012, their pageant
life.12
Many employers use individuals’ online presence and history in
their hiring processes. Seventy percent of United States recruiters re-
port that they have rejected candidates because of information they
found online, such as photos, discussion-board conversations, and
6. Linda Thomas, New Miss Seattle Was ‘Annoyed’ With Us, NEWS CHICK BLOG (Mar. 5,
2012, 2:47 PM), http://mynorthwest.com/646/638888/New-Miss-Seattle-was-annoyed-
with-us?page=4.
7. Rene Lynch, Miss Seattle Sorry for Using Twitter to Bash Seattle, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7,
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/07/nation/la-na-nn-miss-seattle-sorry-twit-
ter-20120307.
8. Id.; see also Sher, supra note 5 (providing examples of television, radio, news, and
blog media coverage of Miss Seattle’s story); Boyle, supra note 5 (same); Thomas, supra
note 6 (same).
9. Thomas, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., id.
11. Jeffery Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all [hereinaf-
ter Rosen, The End of Forgetting].
12. Id.; Thomas, supra note 6.
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participation or membership in controversial groups.13 Some employ-
ers even demand employees and applicants give them their social
networking names and passwords.14 College coaches have also been
known to require the same from their athletes.15
When perfect memory is the norm, it poses the risk of great social
and economic harm. The Internet’s perfect digital memory, auto-
matic archives, and worldwide audience harmed Stacy Snyder, Miss
Seattle 2012, and countless unknown others’ online and offline repu-
tations.16 These examples illustrate that people who post content to
the Internet assume the risks, foreseeable and unforeseeable, associ-
ated with what they publish. Individuals now assume the risk that what
they do on the Internet, especially in social media forums, is accessible
to the entire world.17 This leaves users with two choices: either choose
to be selective in his or her online interactions, or choose not to and
accept the consequences that result from unfiltered actions.
13. Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11.
14. Tierney McAfee, Colleges, Employers, Demand Access to Applicants’ Facebook Accounts,
NBC WASH. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/tech/Colleges-Employ-
ers-Demand-Applicants-Facebook-Passwords-141572703.html. In California and Maryland,
state laws prohibit employers from requesting or demanding access to the social network
profiles of employees or potential applicants. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2013)
(signed into law on Sept. 27, 2012); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012) (Maryland’s law became effective Oct. 1, 2012). In these states, employers also
cannot require employees or job applicants to give them social network user names and
passwords. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980; MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712. Congress has pro-
posed offering similar protection through a proposed federal bill. See Password Protection
Act of 2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/112/hr5684/text.
15. Some college coaches or administrators require college athletes to “friend” them
and allow viewing access to the college athletes’ private posts. McAfee, supra note 14. Cali-
fornia Governor Jerry Brown signed S.B. 1349 into law on September 27, 2012, prohibiting
public and private post-secondary educational institutions from demanding social media
passwords and viewing access to social media profiles of California students, prospective
students, or students groups. S.B. 1349, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at http:/
/leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml;jsessionid=cd4ee55e9a736436443b
9249afea?bill_id=201120120SB1349.
16. A Google search of Miss Seattle 2012’s name, Jean-Sun Hannah Ahn, turns up
links to articles criticizing her controversial tweets about Seattle. Jean-Sun Hannah Ahn
Google Search, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ (type “Jean-Sun Hannah Ahn” in the
search field; click “enter”).
17. See Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Apr. 7, 2013)
(“What you say on Twitter may be viewed all around the world instantly. You are what you
Tweet!”); Erik Lacitis, Miss Seattle’s Missteps on Twitter Provide a Lesson in Social Media 101,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 9, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017713035_twit-
ter10m.html (“There is no such thing as a private tweet. . . . If what you tweeted would run
as a headline, would you be OK with that? If not, don’t use it.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
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This Comment will: (1) call attention to the type and amount of
harm a permanent digital record on the Internet can cause to a per-
son’s reputation; (2) argue for meaningful and effective user control
over personal information on the Internet; (3) recommend recogni-
tion of a “delete-by-default” approach to information stored about
users and the content they generate; and (4) propose legislation that
gives users more control over the data they create on the Internet.
This Comment argues that Congress should enact a law requiring
websites that allow users to create content to provide data expiration
settings that would automatically delete original user-posted content
at a user-selected time. Under this proposed law, users will have more
control over their information posted online that is stored on website
servers. The proposal combines regulation and technology to increase
user control over self-created data. This Comment argues further that
“permanency-by-default” does not have to be the controlling norm on
the Internet when “[a]n entire generation . . . [grows] up in a very
different world, one where people will accumulate detailed records
beginning with childhood that will stay with them for life wherever
they go.”18
I. The Current Problem: Permanent Digital Memory
A. Reputational Harm to Users as a Result of Permanent Digital
Memory
The “openness” of the Internet as well as digital advances, cheap
storage, and improved accessibility have caused permanent electronic
remembering to be the new social norm and electronic forgetting to be the
exception.19 Through digital technology, an exact replica of informa-
tion can be transferred to others at virtually no cost with a simple click
of a mouse.20 This ease, coupled with permanently available informa-
tion, creates a serious risk of harm to one’s reputation, stifles one’s
online interaction and communication, and limits one’s ability to con-
trol his or her own image.21 “Today, forgetting has become costly and
18. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 11 (2007).
19. See Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra note 1, at 52, 101–06.
20. See generally Boyle, supra note 5 (providing a screen-shot copy of Miss Seattle’s
original Tweets from her Twitter account page).
21. See Felix Gillette, Snapchat and the Erasable Future of Social Media, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Feb. 07, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-07/snapchat-
and-the-erasable-future-of-social-media (describing the risks associated with the Internet’s
permanent record and its affect on user behavior); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contex-
tual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 144–45 (discussing context concerns resulting from
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difficult, while remembering is inexpensive and easy.”22 Currently,
most ways to “forget” online require manual deletion and a significant
amount of wait time for removal from the server.23 Manual deletion,
whether used to prevent or react to harm, does not sufficiently incor-
porate the concept of electronic forgetting as contemplated by this
Comment. Even though users can instantly remove user-generated
content from the direct view of other users through privacy settings
and manual deletion, such removal does not address the permanency
problem that this Comment aims to address for a number of reasons.
First, websites require users to act after posting content, but do not
provide a deletion setting that governs removal during or prior to the
act of posting.24 Second, websites provide piecemeal deletion options
rather than general settings that apply to categories of content.25 Fi-
nally, websites, which have an incentive to retain data (and in some
cases, sell that data to third parties), control the removal of data.26
This Comment aims to address these failures.
how easily content shared in one context and meant for a particular audience can be
exposed and misunderstood by a multitude of unintended and unanticipated viewers).
Concerns regarding disclosure of non-consenting third parties’ information is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a discussion of this issue see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Privacy
and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2065–66 (2001); Thomas Claburn, YouTube Tool Blurs
Faces to Protect Privacy, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.informationweek.
com/news/security/privacy/232700524 (describing Google-owned YouTube’s face-blur-
ring technology as a response to privacy concerns of individuals who are depicted in an-
other user’s posted video without their consent).
22. MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER, supra note 1, at 92.
23. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, Three Years Later, Deleting Your Photos on Facebook Now Actually
Works, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 16, 2012, 7:05 AM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/
08/facebook-finally-changes-photo-deletion-policy-after-3-years-of-reporting/ (describing
how in 2009 it could take one to three years to have photos removed from Facebook’s
server, while now it takes around thirty days).
24. See Deleting a Tweet, TWITTER (last visited Apr. 7, 2013), https://support.twitter.
com/articles/18906-how-to-delete-a-tweet [hereinafter Deleting a Tweet].
25. See, e.g., id. (“We do not provide a way to bulk-delete Tweets. You can only delete
Tweets manually, one by one.”); see also Mustaza Mustafa, How to Delete All Facebook Messages
in One Click [Quicktip], HONGKIAT.COM (last visited Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.hongkiat.
com/blog/mass-delete-facebook-messages/ (describing Facebook’s multiple click delete
options and a Google Chrome extension that provides a one-click delete option for
Facebook users).
26. See Gillette, supra note 21 (describing the present business model of social media
websites—acquiring as much user data as possible to sell to marketers); Privacy Policy,
SNAPCHAT, http://www.snapchat.com/privacy (Feb. 20, 2013) (notifying users how and
what information is collected and explaining the website’s policy for deleting user data).
See generally Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/about/
privacy/other (describing how user data is used and shared); James Vincent, Facebook Wants
Your Data, and Magic Legalese Won’t Keep It Away, NEWSTATESMAN.COM, (Nov. 28, 2012, 4:28
PM), http://www.newstatesman.com/technology/2012/11/facebook-wants-your-data-and-
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A person’s reputation has high social, personal, and economic
value, and is essential for social interaction.27 The United States Su-
preme Court has held that “[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong inter-
est in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation.”28 The
scholar Robert Post views reputation as a form of property and argues
that legal recognition of a dignity interest is necessary to protect the
time and effort a person invests in earning, developing, and preserv-
ing his or her reputation.29
Online reputation management companies offer assistance de-
signed to maintain digital reputations, however, as this Comment will
discuss, these reputation companies are insufficient to deal with the
problem of permanent digital memory. For a fee, the California-based
company Reputation.com monitors its client’s online reputations,
contacts individual websites to request the take down of offending
content, and uses technology to “bombard the Web with positive or
neutral information about its customers” to ensure positive informa-
tion shows up first on a Google search.30 Although Internet users may
control the content they generate by manually deleting it, selectively
and strategically censoring what they say, and using online reputation
management companies, these strategies do not provide users with
sufficient control. In today’s world where a person’s “online resume”
or “Google CV” is just as important as his or her offline reputation,31
Congress needs to recognize a dignity interest in online reputation
and provide users’ greater control over their content.
magic-legalese-wont-keep-it-away (explaining Facebook’s policy changes, which allow for
greater retention and broader use of user data and personal information).
27. See generally, SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 30–35 (describing the value of reputation
and how reputation affects social and economic interactions).
28. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966); SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 34 (describ-
ing the value of reputation).
29. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundation of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitu-
tion, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 694, 707-08 (1986); see also SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 34.
30. Rosen, supra note 11 at 35; see also Danielle Cahill, Why Online Reputations Matter,
HERALD SUN (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/why-online-reputations-
matter/story-fn6bfkm6-1225989811452 (discussing how Reputation.com offers clients such
as families, corporations, and individuals tailored services starting at $14 to monitor and
protect both reputations and privacy on the web); REPUTATION.COM, http://www.reputa-
tion.com/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
31. Part I: Answers to Questions About Internet Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2010), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/part-i-answers-to-questions-about-internet-privacy/
?ref=magazine (detailing the responses of Michael Fertik, founder of ReputationDefender,
and Paul Ohm, law Professor at the University of Colorado, to reader questions about
online reputation, use of social media, and maintaining privacy on the Internet).
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B. Benefits and Costs of Perfect Digital Memory
There are both benefits and costs to a permanent digital record.
The costs, however, outweigh the benefits. Benefits of perfect digital
memory include increased accuracy of information; improved effi-
ciency in online market transactions; preservation of a historical re-
cord; increased access to information and knowledge; and increased
trust in interactions and market dealings with others.32 Social media
profiles can also have a positive effect when it comes to hiring pro-
spective employees as profiles provide insight into applicants’ person-
alities, interests, skills, and interactions with others.33 Perfect digital
memory permits more rapid and wider dissemination of information,
which in turn enables economic growth and increases accountability
on the Internet.34 The proposed legislation does not eliminate these
benefits. On the contrary the proposed legislation only minimally re-
stricts accountability because users would be able to permanently de-
lete their self-generated content, but would not be able to remove the
user’s replicated content that third parties copy or generate. It insig-
nificantly affects preservation of a historical record because media and
news sources would still be able to report on and record user content
and furthermore, the majority of user-generated content is not likely
to have historical value. The proposed legislation does not affect the
dissemination of information because third parties would still be able
to copy and redistribute user-generated information. Employers
would still be able to view and access potential employee profiles al-
though with the proposed legislation an employee would possess
more control over the information an employer could access. The
proposed legislation minimally affects the level of trust in market deal-
ings with others because other users will still have access to informa-
32. MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER, supra note 1, at 93–94.
33. In a recent CareerBuilder Survey of hiring managers on the benefits social media
provides employers and applicants during the hiring process, “58% of the respondents said
that it gave them a good feel for the candidates personality, 55% said the profiles conveyed
a professional image, and 54% said that information they found supported the candidate’s
professional qualifications. 51% said that the social media profiles displayed a well-
rounded candidate, showing a wide range of interests, 49% cited great communication
skills, 44% said [social media public profiles] displayed the candidate’s creativity, while
34% said that other people’s online recommendations made a difference.” Nancy Messieh,
Survey: 37% of Employers Look Up Employees on Social Media, THE NEXT WEB, SOCIAL MEDIA
BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2012/04/18/survey-37-of-
your-prospective-employers-are-looking-you-up-on-facebook/.
34. Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11; see also Globalization 101, INFO. TECH.
BLOG, available at http://www.globalization101.org/information-technology/ (last visited
Apr. 5, 2013) (discussing how information technology and increased dissemination of in-
formation foster economic growth).
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tion about the user that third parties can provide. Social media users
are also aware that not all users can be trusted, and it is likely that if a
user is not trustworthy the market will make this known.35
Permanent digital records have several defects that outweigh the
potential benefits. First among these is the high user-costs associated
with such digital records. Permanent digital records make it more dif-
ficult for people to avoid their pasts on the Internet. “[A permanent]
record will affect our ability to define our identities, to obtain jobs, to
participate in public life, and more,”36 because a user may not be able
to escape past actions. The Internet automatically and permanently
associates an individual’s past actions with him or her; however, such
past actions may no longer accurately reflect the individual’s
identity.37
Perfect digital memory can also make self-exploration and self-
expression more costly. In 2002, a fifteen-year-old boy named Ghyslain
filmed himself enthusiastically pretend-fighting an invisible opponent
with a lightsaber-like object, sound effects included.38 Although Ghys-
lain did not intend for others to see the video, kids at his school dis-
covered the video and uploaded it to the Internet, and the “Star Wars
Kid” became an instant hit.39 Ghyslain’s two minutes of youthful self-
expression resulted in numerous websites providing edited versions of
the video where users added insulting comments. Popular television
series like Family Guy and Arrested Development also made fun of
Ghyslain.40 Major print and online newspapers and magazines wrote
about Ghyslain’s story and fueled worldwide interest in the video.41
Remarkably, fans of the “Star Wars Kid” signed an unsolicited online
petition lobbying George Lucas’ film company to give Ghyslain a role
35. See, e.g., Helen Popkin, Facebook: More Than 83 Million Users Are Fake, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/facebook-more-83-mil-
lion-users-are-fake-919873 (reporting that 8.7% of Facebook’s active monthly users have
fake accounts).
36. SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 17.
37. Samuel Axon, The “Star Wars Kid”: Where Is He Now?, MASHABLE ENT. (Jun. 3,
2010), http://mashable.com/2010/06/03/star-wars-kid/ (describing how a playful child-
hood video continues to follow the now-grown-up Canadian lawyer).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Amy Harmon, Compressed Data: Fame Is No Laughing Matter for the ‘Star Wars Kid’,
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/19/business/compressed-
data-fame-is-no-laughing-matter-for-the-star-wars-kid.html; see also Jaime Holguin, The
Strange World of Web Celebs, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
18563_162-584216.html; Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC NEWS, (Nov. 27, 2006), http:/
/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm.
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in the film Star Wars Episode III, and although unsuccessful, the peti-
tion garnered over 145,000 signatures.42 After the incident, Ghyslain
dropped out of high school, suffered from depression, and sought
psychiatric care.43 Even today he cannot separate his identity from the
video.44
The legislation this Comment proposes45 could not have re-
dressed the harm suffered by Ghyslain under the particular circum-
stances of his case, since a third party posted the video to the Internet
and others then copied it. However, if the legislation that this Com-
ment proposes were in place when Ghyslain uploaded the video to his
own Facebook account, Ghyslain could have set the video to delete
after a short amount of time, before a third party was able to copy his
content.
Ghyslain’s story illustrates that the more information appears in
permanent digital form and is accessible to anyone, anywhere, the
harder it will be to avoid ties to personal information by physically
moving to another social circle, school, job, or state.46 A person’s on-
line identity effectively travels with that person forever once the data is
posted online.47 Daniel Solove aptly notes that, “[t]he Internet is
bringing back the scarlet letter in digital form – an indelible record of
people’s past misdeeds.”48 Digital memory persists forever. Besides be-
ing difficult and costly, it creates the risk that a picture or comment
posted while a person is young may hinder his or her admission to
college or employment attractiveness.49 Self-censorship, harm to repu-
42. Ghyslain Petition to Lucasfilm Ltd., PETITIONONLINE, http://www.petitiononline.
com/Ghyslain/petition.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
43. Star Wars Kid Files Lawsuit, WIRED (July 24, 2003), http://www.wired.com/culture/
lifestyle/news/2003/07/59757 [hereinafter Star Wars Kid]; Alex Pasternak, After Lawsuits
and Therapy, Star Wars Kid is Back, MOTHERBOARD, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/af-
ter-lawsuits-and-therapy-star-wars-kid-is-back (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
44. See Axon, supra note 37 (describing how the video continues to impact Ghyslain’s
life).
45. See infra Part II.
46. See Star Wars Kid, supra note 43 (describing Ghyslain’s current work as a law stu-
dent and President of a non-profit while noting that the video still followed him).
47. See Mayer-Scho¨nberger, supra note 1, at 52.
48. SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 11.
49. In a 2011 Kaplan Test Prep survey of college admissions counselors’, 24% of re-
spondents admitted to going onto applicants’ public Facebook or other social networking
page, and 12% admitted that online discovery of something about an applicant negatively
affected an applicant’s application. KAPLAN, HIGHLIGHTS FROM KAPLAN TEST PREP’S 2011
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS OFFICERS SURVEY (2011), available at http://press.kaptest.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Kaplan-Test-Preps-2011-Survey-of-College-Admissions-Officers.
pdf; A recent CareerBuilder Survey, which questioned approximately 2,300 hiring manag-
ers and human resources professionals in February and March 2012, indicated that at least
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tation, and persistent criticism of youthful indiscretions of those who
have matured beyond them are also costs of perfect digital memory.
These high costs to users outweigh the minimal effect that the legisla-
tion this Comment proposes has on the above benefits, and justify the
legislation. The proposed legislation, which requires social media web-
sites to allow user-generated information to be electronically forgotten
through user-selected delete settings and only minimally restricts user
accountability,50 is necessary to alleviate the harms discussed above.
C. Scholars’ Proposed Solutions to Address the Costs of Perfect
Digital Memory
Legal scholars have suggested a variety of ways to address reputa-
tional harm from the Internet’s permanent record keeping. One such
scholar, Jonathan Zittrain, argues that people should be allowed to
declare a form of “reputation bankruptcy,” similar to personal finan-
cial bankruptcy, which would allow them to erase various categories of
sensitive information.51 Such sensitive information may relate to per-
sonal or professional mistakes that are widely publicized, indiscretions
such as drunk driving and drug charges, and personal, dating, and
professional matters that influence a person’s reputation.52 Under Zit-
train’s view, it might not be feasible for individuals to selectively delete
entire records of sensitive information about them without a cost.53
Therefore, Zittrain posits that both good and bad information would
disappear together to serve “[a]s a safety valve against excess[ive] ex-
perimentation.”54 Zittrain suggests that we should implement the idea
of electronic forgetting into the digital world and notes that this digital
do over approach would work best with social networking sites where
people interact with one another by sharing information in the same
network.55 Under this approach, Zittrain emphasizes that individuals
should be able to “express a choice to deemphasize if not entirely
37% of employers look to the public social media profiles of prospective employees before
making a final decision. The study indicated that one third of hiring managers said that
negative content on such profiles led to applicants not getting a position: 49% cited inap-
propriate photographs; 45% cited discussion about drinking and drug use; 35% cited
speaking poorly of a previous employer; 28% cited discriminatory remarks; and 22% cited
lying about qualifications. Messieh, supra note 33.
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228–31
(2008).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 229.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 228–29.
Spring 2013] DATA EXPIRATION 817
delete older information that has been generated about them by and
through various systems: political preferences, activities, youthful likes
and dislikes.”56
Zittrain’s view of reputation bankruptcy, while providing users
with more control over their reputations, asks too much from the user
because it requires the user to: (1) formally declare reputation bank-
ruptcy, which may carry a stigma; (2) “forget” after he or she suffers
harm; and (3) forgo association with positive information in exchange
for disassociation from unwanted information.57 It also does not re-
quire any independent action from the social network website.58 Inde-
pendent website action is crucial because in order to successfully
implement a norm of forgetting on the Internet action from both
websites and users is necessary. When websites are required to act to
implement a specific service, like deletion options, the power gap that
exists between websites and users is narrowed because both are acting
to implement the norm; it is no longer a one-sided effort on the part
of the weaker party—the user.
In a recent New York Times Magazine article, Jeffery Rosen de-
scribed another solution set forth by Paul Ohm. Ohm’s solution aims
to address harms in the employment relationship by implementing a
discrimination ban for specific online content.59 Ohm suggests that
employers should not be allowed to fire or refuse to hire anyone on
the basis of legal off-duty conduct that is revealed in public profiles on
Facebook or Google profiles.60 Ohm supports the passage of “a prohi-
bition on the sorts of information employers can and can’t consider
when they hire someone.”61 Many states already have laws that pro-
hibit employers from discriminating against employees for legal, non-
employment related conduct like smoking.62 State legislators could
extend such laws to shield certain categories of information about a
person, like distasteful Facebook pictures, offensive status updates, or
other legal but controversial information from the employer’s hiring
decision.63 While Ohm’s solution is tenable, it is insufficient for sev-
eral reasons. First, it fails to address the permanency problem. Sec-
56. Id. at 229.
57. ZITTRAIN, supra note 51, at 229.
58. Id.
59. Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (listing California, New York, Colorado, and North Dakota as states with such
laws).
63. Id.
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ond, it requires no change from social network websites. Lastly, it
offers users protection from, not control over, their reputations.
Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger presents arguably the best solution,
proposing that digital storage devices, such as computers and mobile
phones, should automatically delete information that reaches a user-
set “expiration date.”64 For example, when a user saves a document, in
addition to naming the document and selecting a location to store it
on the hard drive, the user would also select an expiration date.65
Mayer-Scho¨nberger argues that the Internet must develop the ability
to mimic human forgetting through user-applied, built-in expiration
dates to each piece of data.66 Through the idea of expiration func-
tions, Mayer-Scho¨nberger emphasizes that the concept of forgetting
can and should be reintroduced into our daily activities and routines
on the Internet.67 Mayer-Scho¨nberger recognizes that there is a “lifes-
pan of information” that people choose to make available on the In-
ternet.68 Expiration dates, he argues, are “designed to confront us
with (and thus remind us of) the ‘finiteness of information’—in other
words, that information is inexorably linked to a point (or period) in
time, and that over time most information loses its informational
value.”69 Mayer-Scho¨nberger’s solution, however, does not go far
enough because it does not require social network websites to provide
users with an expiration date mechanism. This Comment proposes
legislation that requires websites to provide such a mechanism.
II. The Online User Data Expiration Act
A. Statutory Provisions of the Online User Data Expiration Act
Mayer-Scho¨nberger’s idea of expiration settings for data on the
Internet by mandating that specific websites offer users deletion tech-
nology that provides control over the data they generate is included in
the proposed legislation. The proposed legislation, the Online User
Data Expiration Act (“OUDEA”), specifically requires all U.S. websites
that allow users to post self-generated content to provide, as a free
64. MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER, supra note 1, at 171-73.
65. Id. at 171.
66. Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11.
67. MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER, supra note 1, at 172-73.
68. Id. at 173.
69. Id. at 171.
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service, data destruction technology for all such original, user-gener-
ated content. The provisions of OUDEA70 would be as follows:
§ 1: Definitions.
a. “Agency” refers to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or
another administrative entity to be formed and funded by Congress to
enforce these provisions.
b. “Communicative Act” refers to the method of Notice utilized
by the Website. It must inform the User that his or her Content has
been removed and deleted. The Act must be in the form of email,
pop-up window, notification system, weekly and/or monthly report, or
other similar notification system and must identify and summarize the
deleted Content and action(s).
c. “Content” refers to any: text; word; photo; comment; “like”;
“tweet”; video; review; music; graphic; and/or any combination of the
above. “Content” also includes any other communicative or expressive
act having a similar effect as those listed above.
d. “Data Expiration Setting” refers to a control option that each
Website in § 2 (a) must provide in its Website Service. The Data Expi-
ration Setting must allow Users to manually choose between preset
time ranges of various durations. The Data Expiration Setting must
offer the use of Expiration Technology approved by the Agency that
has the capability of destroying data.
e. “Expiration Technology” refers to technology approved by the
Agency that is capable of independently and permanently deleting
original data.
f. “Independent Panel” or “Panel” refers to a review committee
that will comprise of three officials. Creation of the Panel, its proce-
dures, and selection of its officers shall be determined and funded by
Congress. The FTC or other Congress-selected agency is in charge of
regulating the Panel.
g. “Notice” refers to a Communicative Act from the Website to
the User. It is required to inform Users of Expiration Technology and
Expiration Settings, as well as any updates or changes to the Technol-
ogy or Settings. Notice is required within a reasonable amount of
time, but no later than two (2) weeks, after the deletion of a User’s
User-Generated Content.
70. The Online User Data Expiration Act (“OUDEA”) is the author’s original legisla-
tion, meant as a guideline for what this type of legislation should look like in order to
effectively protect users’ deletion rights.
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h. “Service” refers to any part of a Website’s offerings or function
that is provided at a network address on the Internet.
i. “User” refers to any person, IP address, computer, entity, or
thing that electronically communicates with, uses, accesses, or browses
the Website.
j. “User-Generated” refers to the specific act of the User whereby
Content is created, added, posted, edited, or placed on the Website. It
includes but is not limited to Content in which the User would have a
copyright interest.
k. “Website” refers to any Internet actor or entity with a .com,
.org, .edu, .gov, any other generic top-level domain used on the In-
ternet71 or domain name that permits user access to a service—includ-
ing the posting of text, information, sound, images, video, or any
combination of the above—and that allows users to create, generate,
or enter content onto its site, which is then made either visible or
audible on the Internet actor or stored on the Internet actor’s server.
Private and public entities are included.
§ 2: Mandatory Provisions.
a. All Websites must provide a Data Expiration Setting and corre-
sponding Expiration Technology as a free Service to their Users. The
Data Expiration Setting must apply to original User-Generated Con-
tent. Each Website must notify its Users of the Expiration Technology
and provide clear, unambiguous, and meaningful instructions on how
to use the Data Expiration Setting. Such Notice must explain what
happens to the User-Generated Content upon deletion.
b. A Data Expiration Setting must be provided for all original
User-Generated Content and must:
1. be easy to use and not overly time consuming for the User;
2. provide meaningful expiration options, which the User can
freely reset without limit and must range from, but not be limited to:
one (1) minute to never expire; and
3. provide Notice.
c. Expiration Technology must be implemented within six (6)
months from the passage of OUDEA. Prior to, or on the first day
OUDEA becomes effective (six (6) months after passage), each Web-
site must submit to the Agency a report in writing:
1. describing the Expiration Technology used;
71. See generally Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), ICANN.ORG, http://archive.icann.org/en/
tlds/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (describing generic top-level domains).
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2. establishing that the Expiration Technology is either Agency
pre-approved or that the Expiration Technology used is equivalent in
all respects to the Agency pre-approved version;
3. listing and explaining Expiration Technology options and
functions; and
4. identifying Notice procedures and methods for compliance.
d. Websites shall not retain, cache, or copy any User-Generated
Content past the user’s specified expiration date for such Content. All
traces of User-Generated Content must be removed from a website’s
server upon the user’s-specified expiration date.
§ 3: Enforcement.
a. A violation for failure to comply with § 2 of OUDEA will result
in a fine of twenty-five thousand ($25,000) U.S. dollars.72 Full compli-
ance with OUDEA must be met within 180 days from the date finding
a violation of compliance. For every week thereafter, a three thousand
($3,000) U.S. dollar per day fine will result until full compliance is
met.73
1. A Website may respond to violation allegations and is enti-
tled to a hearing by Independent Panel.
2. Upon a finding by the Panel that a Website was in compli-
ance, the twenty-five thousand ($25,000) U.S. dollar fine will not ap-
ply. If the Panel finds a Website made reasonable, good faith efforts to
comply with OUDEA, but nonetheless was not in compliance, the
twenty-five thousand ($25,000) U.S. dollar fine will not apply on the
condition that full compliance with OUDEA be met within one hun-
dred eighty (180) days from the date of the Panel’s finding.
3. Upon a finding by the Panel of a Website’s failure to delete
from its server all copies of the User-Generated Content upon the
User’s Data Expiration Setting, that User will have a private right of
action against the offending Website for special and general damages
72. I base my enforcement penalty amounts on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), where civil liability for copyright infringement ranges from an order to pay
either actual damages or “statutory” damages of not less than $750 and not more than
$30,000 per work infringed, assuming that the infringement was not willful. If the infringe-
ment is willful, statutory damages increase. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
73. The monetary amount of these penalties are intended to serve as a deterrence to
noncompliance by large and small website companies. The amounts were reached based
on the following considerations: the DMCA penalties listed above (§ 504); deterrence in-
terests; the freedom of a business to operate, fostering business growth, encouraging web-
site to offer services where users can create data; and fairness interests to websites of all
sizes. These amounts are included only as guidelines for Congress to follow when consider-
ing implementing such legislation.
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of up to thirty thousand ($30,000) U.S. dollars per finding, with addi-
tional attorneys’ fees and costs provided.
4. Any person who is entitled to bring a private right of action
on his or her own behalf against an allegedly violating Website for an
act or practice declared unlawful by §2 of OUDEA may bring a class
action against such Website(s) on behalf of any class of persons of
which he or she is a member and which has been harmed by such
unlawful act or practice. Recovery shall be limited to actual harm suf-
fered by the person or persons, with additional attorneys’ fees and
costs provided. This paragraph is not intended to create or permit
class action relief where not permitted by state law.
B. OUDEA’s Model Technology
Expiration technology is a feasible option to deal with permanent
digital memory, and software developers continue to create various
forms of it.74 Presently, OUDEA’s ideal standard for expiration tech-
nology would be similar to the security software used by a mobile
phone application that physicians use on their mobile devices called
TigerText.75 TigerText uses technology that gives users a privacy-fo-
74. See, e.g., John Markoff, New Technology to Make Digital Data Self-Destruct, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/science/21crypto.html (describing
the University of Washington’s data deletion software called Vanish); Michael Zhang, X-
pire! Software Adds a Self-Destruct Feature to Your Digital Photos, PETALPIXEL.COM (Jan. 17,
2011), http://www.petapixel.com/2011/01/17/x-pire-software-adds-a-self-destruct-feature-
to-your-digital-photos/ (discussing the German Facebook application X-pire, which adds
an expiration date to photographs that makes the photograph inaccessible and invisible at
a user’s preset time). Examples of applications and websites that offer forms of deletion
technology include: Snapchat, Burn Note, Wickr, Facebook Poke, and TigerText.
75. At present, TigerText is the model technology for OUDEA. This section is not
intended to limit OUDEA deletion technology to technology like TigerText. In the event
that better, more efficient and secure technology is developed in the future, this technol-
ogy should be evaluated to determine whether the interests of OUDEA are better served
through the implementation of such technology. Because self-destructing data phone ap-
plications are becoming more popular, the evolution and development of lifespan-data
technology is likely to improve and flourish. See Rheana Murray, Facebook Poke App Can’t
Beat Snapchat, But Questions Raised About Security, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Jan. 2, 2013), http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/facebook-poke-app-beat-snapchat-article-1.1231380
(discussing Facebook’s attempt to compete with the Snapchat app and acknowledging the
need for future technology improvements); Company Overview of TigerText, Inc., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=113895949 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). According to TigerText.com, “TigerText
offers a fully encrypted, SaaS platform for secure text messaging.” Benefits, TIGERTEXT,
http://www.tigertext.com/benefits/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). When a user sends a
TigerText, he or she can pre-set the lifespan of the message. The message stays encrypted
in transit and, upon receipt, it cannot be forwarded, stored, or copied anywhere. Once it
expires, it is deleted from all servers, and from both the senders’ and recipients’ phones.
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cused service.76 A sender is notified through a specific set of small
corresponding icons once his or her message is received, opened, and
expires.77 By using TigerText, senders can pre-set text messages to ex-
pire from one minute to thirty days after sending.78 Upon expiration,
the text will disappear from all servers and from the sender and recipi-
ent phones.79 TigerText offers a delete-on-read setting which, once a
message is opened by its recipient, counts down from fifty-nine
seconds before it automatically disappears.80 There is even a delete-
history setting that erases the record of expired messages.81 Ideally,
websites should implement TigerText-like technology and use it the
same way for user-generated content posted to the Internet. TigerText
offers tailored features such as messaging from PCs and Macs and can
easily be integrated into other networks and operating systems.82 The
level of control that TigerText provides for its users through its
software design and deletion settings is the type of user control over
user-generated content that OUDEA secures for users.83
C. How OUDEA Would Address Concerns About Permanent
Digital Memory
OUDEA’s provisions would enhance user control by permitting
users to dictate the lifespan of the content they generate on the In-
For a more detailed description of how TigerText software works see Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, TIGERTEXT, http://downloads.tigertext.com/faq#11 (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) [here-
inafter TigerText FAQ].
76. See Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11; TIGERTEXT, http://www.tigertext.
com/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); Jessica Galliart, Does It Work?: Tiger Text’s Disappearing Text
Messages, EVERYTHINGICAFE.COM (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.everythingicafe.com/does-it-
work-tiger-texts-disappearing-text-messages/2010/03/04/ (explaining how TigerText
works); TigerTextMedia, TigerText Product Walkthrough for iOS, YOUTUBE (June 15, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4Z0b5gVyOQ (illustrating how to use the application
and how the technology works).
77. TigerText FAQ, supra note 75. “When a message is received, the sender will see an
orange box with a check. When a message is opened by the recipient, the sender will see a
green circle with a check. When the message expires, the sender and recipient will see
tiger paws walking across the screen.” Id.
78. Rosen, The End of Forgetting, supra note 11.
79. TigerText FAQ, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See For Consumers, TIGERTEXT, http://www.tigertext.com/consumer/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2013) [hereinafter TigerText For Consumers] (listing TigerText features and product
offerings); Features, TIGERTEXT, http://www.tigertext.com/features/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2013) (explaining that TigerText integrates easily with information systems).
83. “With TigerText, you, your friends and family can now say what you want, when
you want—while still keeping control over your texts.” See TigerText For Consumers, supra
note 82.
824 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
ternet. OUDEA would allow users to direct websites to no longer hold
on to their user-generated content forever,84 while OUDEA’s fines
and private right of action would serve as strong enforcement mecha-
nisms to support users’ demands for the removal of user-generated
content.85
OUDEA would make it easier for users to erase past indiscretions,
photos, and comments from the Internet. OUDEA allows users to
choose whether data should expire, and if so selected, the amount of
time before expiration occurs.86 Under OUDEA, a Facebook user
could set her status updates to “expire” after seven days, or a Twitter
user, like Miss Seattle 2012, could set her tweets to expire after four-
teen days.87 Users’ sense of protection from future, unknown harms
caused by their user-generated content would improve and self-cen-
sorship would lessen because there would be fewer ways for one’s past
online interactions to come back to haunt them. Although OUDEA
would not protect users from another person who copies, reposts, or
saves their content, it would require that every trace of their original
content be deleted from Facebook and Twitter sites and their servers,
which would reduce the availability of such content.88
D. OUDEA Would Help Achieve a Delete-by-Default Norm
OUDEA embodies a major step forward towards a delete-by-de-
fault approach for user-generated information. Even though OUDEA
would require websites to provide deletion technology for user-gener-
ated content and to abide by user choice,89 users would have to take
advantage of this expiration technology to make delete-by-default the
norm.
User desire for delete-by-default exists.90 While people are clearly
willing to share a tremendous amount of personal information online,
they still care whether a website keeps a permanent record of their
84. See supra Part II.A.
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. See supra Part II.A.
87. See supra Part II.A.
88. See supra Part II.A.
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See Gillette, supra note 21 (describing user popularity of the Snapchat application,
an app that allows users to share impermanent media with others, and user popularity of
former start-up Drop.io’s data expiration settings); Greg Crowe, Self-Deleting E-mails: An
Enterprise Nightmare?, GCN BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:58 AM), http://gcn.com/blogs/mobile/
2013/01/self-deleting-emails-personal-protection-or-enterprise-nightmare.aspx (discussing
self-destructing emails and user demand for data destruction).
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personal information and online activity.91 In a recent University of
California Berkeley study, a significant majority of Americans, ranging
from ages eighteen to sixty-five and over, agreed that laws should re-
quire websites to delete all stored information about them.92 Because
these individuals support the passage of a law that would require web-
sites to delete stored personal information, they would likely support
legislation like OUDEA which requires websites to delete their user-
generated content.93
E. OUDEA Respects Speech Interests Which Europe’s Proposal
Fails to Do
European and American laws conflict in their treatment of pri-
vacy and free speech interests in the context of a right to be forgotten.
European law is much more protective of privacy rights and less pro-
tective of free speech than United States law, which is more protective
of speech interests and censorship concerns and less protective of
privacy.94
In response to increased awareness of privacy concerns regarding
personal information on the Internet, the European Union has re-
cently proposed an expansive and highly protective privacy right
known as the “right to be forgotten.”95 The new data protection pro-
posal provides European Union citizens the right to request that their
data be deleted by third-party providers, including social networks like
Facebook, Google+, and Twitter, if no legitimate reason to keep the
91. Gillette, supra note 21; see also Jason Gilbert, Burn Note: Email Messages That Self-
Destruct Automatically After One Minute, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/burn-note-email-messages-self-destruct_n_1245480.html
(explaining how Burn Note works and its benefits to potential customers).
92. In response to the question, “Do you think there should be a law that requires
websites and advertising companies to delete all stored information about an individual, or
do you feel such a law is not necessary?,” 92% of 975 respondents answered, “[y]es [there]
should be a law” (yes responses by age group were as follows: 88% ages 18–24; 91% ages
25–34; 90% ages 35–44; 94% ages 45–54; 94% ages 55–64; and 90% ages 65+). CHRIS
HOOFNAGLE ET AL., HOW DIFFERENT ARE YOUNG ADULTS FROM OLDER ADULTS WHEN IT
COMES TO INFORMATION PRIVACY ATTITUDES & POLICIES? 11 (2010), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864.
93. See Gillette, supra note 21 (describing user desire for government intervention
regarding permanent social records).
94. See M. Patrick Yingling, Europe: Privacy and Free Speech, JURIST (May 25, 2010),
http://jurist.org/dateline/2010/05/germany-international-concepts-of-privacy.php
(describing differing American and European notions of the legal principles surrounding
privacy and free speech).
95. Jeffery Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten [herein-
after Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten].
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information exists.96 The new right would apply to information di-
rectly published by an individual and “any information relating to a
data subject.”97 The data regulation would also exempt data posted
“for journalistic purposes or for the purposes of artistic or literary ex-
pression.”98 Once a user contacts Facebook with a take down request
regarding specific content originally posted by the user, Facebook
“must take ‘all reasonable steps’ on its own to identify any relevant
third parties and secure the takedown of the content.”99 This require-
ment illustrates how European law holds Internet service providers to
a duty to filter and protect the privacy of others, even when that
means removing third party posts.100 The European regulation would
provide for a sanction of one million euros or up to two percent of
Facebook’s annual worldwide income if Facebook intentionally or
negligently failed to comply with the European regulation’s “right to
be forgotten” provisions.101
In 2011, while on business in Switzerland, Peter Fleischer,
Google’s global privacy counsel, took to his blog to express his opin-
ion about the right to be electronically forgotten.102 To explain his
opinion, Fleischer discusses three questions about how far the right to
96. Zack Whittaker, European ‘Right-to-Delete’ Law: How Enforceable is Facebook?, ZDNET
(Nov. 14, 2011, 3:42 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/european-8216right-to-de-
lete-law-how-enforceable-is-facebook/909; see also Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Process-
ing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation),
at 47-50, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Data Protection Regula-
tion], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/
com_2012_11_en.pdf (detailing fundamental rights that justify personal information pri-
vacy protection).
97. Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 96, at 41; see also Rosen, The Right to
Be Forgotten, supra note 95, at 89.
98. Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 96, at 94; see also Rosen, The Right to
Be Forgotten, supra note 95, at 90.
99. Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, supra note 95, at 90 (quoting Proposed Data Protec-
tion Regulation, supra note 96, at 51).
100. “Article 17 provides the data subject’s right to be forgotten and to erasure. It
further elaborates and specifies the right of erasure provided for in Article 12(b) of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC and provides the conditions of the right to be forgotten, including the
obligation of the controller which has made the personal data public to inform third par-
ties on the data subject’s request to erase any links to, or copy or replication of that per-
sonal data. It also integrates the right to have the processing restricted in certain cases,
avoiding the ambiguous terminology ‘blocking.’” Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra
note 96, at 9, 51–53.
101. Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 96, at 92–94; see also Rosen, The Right
to Be Forgotten, supra note 95, at 90–91.
102. Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, PETER FLEISCHER: PRI-
VACY . . . ? BLOG (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:59 PM), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/
foggy-thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html.
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be electronically forgotten should extend including: (1) “If I post
something online, should I have the right to delete it again?”; (2) “If I
post something, and someone else copies it and re-posts it on their
own site, do I have the right to delete it?”; and (3) “If someone else
posts something about me, should I have a right to delete it?”103 The
European regulation would answer “yes” to each of Fleischer’s ques-
tions.104 However, my OUDEA proposal would answer “yes” only to
Fleischer’s first question; if a user posts something online he or she
has a right to delete it.105 Even though the user’s right to be forgotten
would not apply to user-generated content that is subsequently copied
and reposted by another user, OUDEA’s provisions would still in-
crease a user’s control over the information she has posted. The less
content available for others to copy and repost, the lower the risk of
harm. Thus, OUDEA would increase user control over personal infor-
mation on the Internet, but would be narrower than the European
regulation.
III. Addressing Criticisms to OUDEA
A. Users Already Have Delete Options
Some view OUDEA as unnecessary because websites already pro-
vide users with delete options.106 Although websites and social net-
works allow users to delete the content they post to the Internet, this
does not obviate legislation like OUDEA. At present, most websites
require users to manually delete, piece by piece, the content they no
longer want to remain on their sites.107 The time and effort that re-
quires likely deters many users from engaging in the content removal
process. Because websites generally want to keep as much data about
their users as possible,108 it is no surprise that many websites do not
offer deletion in bulk.109
103. Id.
104. See generally Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 96; Fleischer, supra note
102.
105. Fleischer, supra note 102.
106. Deleting a Tweet, supra note 24; see also How Do I Hide and Delete Posts from My
Facebook Page? What’s the Difference?, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
252986458110193 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
107. See Deleting a Tweet, supra note 24.
108. See Gillette, supra note 21 (explaining Facebook’s business model of storing and
collecting user data to sell to markers and specifically noting that in January 2013,
“Facebook began rolling out Graph Search, a tool to retrieve details from the pasts of its
billion users”).
109. According to Twitter, to delete a single tweet a user must follow these steps: (1)
log in to twitter.com; (2) visit the user’s profile page; (3) locate the tweet to be deleted;
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Websites’ default privacy practices allow users to manually alter
view settings and manage their privacy settings.110 This manual man-
agement takes time and requires users to understand what each set-
ting does and the specific activities the settings manage. Users may
simply choose to do nothing and leave their settings on the website’s
predetermined defaults, which usually reflect a “broadcast” ap-
proach.111 Some are likely to argue that a website’s offering of a data
deletion expiration setting under OUDEA would also be associated
with high user-costs,112 especially because users would have to evaluate
different factors to determine what information to delete and when it
should be deleted.113 Under OUDEA, however, this would be a one-
time cost because OUDEA would make it easy to automatically delete
content in bulk using the expiration setting options. For example, a
Twitter user could preset all tweets to delete every five days. The user-
cost associated with such a decision would involve only the time and
effort required to make the initial deletion setting.
B. Users Have Control Through Privacy and View Settings
Some may argue that OUDEA is unnecessary because users al-
ready control their information and reputation through current web-
site privacy and view settings. However, privacy and view settings alone
and (4) place the mouse over the message and click delete. Deleting a Tweet, supra note 24.
The site notes that “[d]eleted [t]weets sometimes hang out in Twitter search, they will
clear with time” but fails to provide any time frame. Id. The only option is to delete tweets
one-by-one; Twitter “do[es] not provide a way to bulk-delete [t]weets.” Id.
110. See, e.g., Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
325807937506242 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
111. See, e.g., About Public and Protected Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/
articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (notifying users
that the default Twitter account setting for tweets is public); Colin Zick, On or Off? Setting
Defaults for Privacy Online, SECURITY, PRIVACY & L. (June 15, 2012), http://www.securi-
typrivacyandthelaw.com/2012/06/articles/retail-customer-information-sp/on-or-off-set-
ting-defaults-for-privacy-online/ (describing how “Do Not Track” is set as “off” by default
for Microsoft’s Mozilla FireFox Internet browser and that users do not know that they are
being “tracked” in the first place); Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing general
theories of default rules).
112. Such costs include learning how to use the settings and learning about the tech-
nology offered, arguably a low cost because OUDEA mandates that websites make this easy;
decision-making costs in determining what content to delete and when to delete it; and
time costs associated with setting time limits.
113. Different factors that users may consider include: (1) the circumstances under
which they are publishing content; (2) whether they want the content to remain forever or
to be permanently erased after a certain period of time; (3) who can view the content; (4)
risk of potential harm posed by the content; and (5) value of the content and potential
benefits to the user for allowing the content to remain on the Internet.
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are not enough because not all websites provide the same level of pro-
tection.114 OUDEA would give users more control over their informa-
tion by mandating that websites provide a deletion setting, rather than
letting the websites make that choice themselves.115 OUDEA would
also provide users with the power and right to decide when they want
their content to be deleted.116
C. Mandated Deletion Technology is Unnecessary When Websites
can Delete User Content Themselves
Some may claim that because websites already have the ability to
delete, mandated deletion technology is unnecessary. This criticism
ignores that self-interested website operators have much more incen-
tive to resist deletion than purveyors of independent expiration tech-
nology. Website operators profit from gathering, storing, aggregating,
and selling user information and the social media business model is to
collect and use information without limitation.117 Whereas entities
that offer expiration technology do not rely on the retention and un-
fettered use of user data—they rely on its deletion.118 Further, the
expiration technology that OUDEA requires would eliminate the time
and effort websites expend on data removal and eliminate waiting pe-
riods that users are currently required to accept because the technol-
114. Compare Protecting and Unprotecting Your Tweets, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.
com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/107-my-profile-account-settings/articles/20169886-
how-to-protect-and-unprotect-your-tweets (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (detailing user-ac-
count privacy options where users may opt to protect tweets from the default public view,
however once the setting is changed back to unprotected all previous protected tweets
become public. Upon protection selection, only user-approved followers can view that
user’s tweets and the user can prevent users from re-tweeting his or her tweets through
other setting selections), with Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/help/325807937506242/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), and Advanced Privacy
Controls, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/466544860022370/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2013) (describing privacy settings for Timeline viewers including: content sharing, lim-
iting public visibility of posts, tags, photographs, and profile picture and information, and
user control over removing other user’s tags of that user in photographs and posts).
115. See supra Part II.A.
116. See supra Part II.A.
117. See Gillette, supra note 21 (describing the present business model of social media
websites, which is to acquire as much user data as possible to sell to marketers).
118. See Privacy Policy, BURN NOTE, https://burnnote.com/privacy (explaining that “it
is Burn Note’s policy to expunge your data as soon as possible after it has served its pur-
pose”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); G.F., This Message Will Self-destruct, THE ECONOMIST BAB-
BAGE BLOG (Aug. 5, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2012/
08/internet-security (describing the development of self-deleting technology and services
in response to a “backlash against the culture of constant sharing and archiving that
Facebook, Twitter and other social networks encourage”).
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ogy would independently and automatically delete the information.119
OUDEA would also provide users with notice and a remedy to ensure
that when a website says data will be deleted they either fulfill that
promise or face the consequences.120
D. OUDEA Demands Too Much of Websites
Website operators may argue that OUDEA demands too much by
requiring them to implement independent deletion technology, cre-
ate a setting application, and provide users with notice. However, web-
sites frequently delete and remove data from their servers and offer
deletion options to their users.121 Since a majority of companies and
service providers presently offer deletion technology and control,
OUDEA’s data deletion concept is not radically new.
Twitter, for example, notifies its users that they retain the rights
to any content they submit, but that through the act of posting con-
tent through Twitter’s service, the user grants Twitter a “worldwide,
non-exclusive, royalty-free license” to do just about anything with his
or her tweets.122 Since Twitter acknowledges that users retain the
rights to any content they submit, it would be consistent with Twitter’s
offering to allow users to choose whether they want Twitter to have
that content forever. It would not be impossible for a website to offer
technology that automatically deletes content,123 especially because
technology like TigerText is available and can be implemented into
the website system124. It would save the website time and money be-
119. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 23 (noting that Facebook takes up to thirty days to
permanently remove photos from its server).
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. See supra note 107.
122. Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
123. Facebook already offers this service through its Poke mobile phone application.
See Heather Kelly, Facebook Releases Poke App for Self-destructing Messages, CNN (Dec. 22,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/21/tech/social-media/facebook-poke-app (describ-
ing Facebook’s Poke mobile phone application, which allows users to send time-limited
disappearing messages to their Facebook friends). But see Jim Edwards, Facebook’s Self-delet-
ing Pokes Can Be Resurrected 90 Days Later, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/facebooks-poke-photos-last-up-to-90-days-2013-1 (describing that dis-
appear does not mean delete, that deletion is not permanent until 90 days after the expira-
tion, and that the content can be retrieved from logs and backup storage).
124. See supra note 77 (describing TigerText); Tomio Geron, TigerText Secures (and Er-
ases) Your Text Messages, FORBES (June 15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomi-
ogeron/2011/06/15/tigertext-secures-and-erases-your-text-messages/ (stating that the
consumer service of TigerText is free and that TigerText offers a paid enterprise service
where companies can control the settings of the messages its employees send). Geron ex-
plains “the site has had traction among hospitals, which need to comply with HIPAA laws
about how information about patients can be distributed among hospital employees. The
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cause some user-generated content would automatically delete in bulk
without action by the website. The technology could be programmed
to notify the user directly and automatically when specific content has
been deleted,125 which would require no separate action by the web-
site.126 For these reasons, what OUDEA would require from websites is
not overly burdensome.
In December 2012, Facebook introduced a mobile phone appli-
cation called Facebook Poke which allows Facebook users to send
photos, messages, pokes, and ten-second videos to Facebook friends
which expire and disappear after a designated period of time ranging
from one to ten seconds.127 Although Facebook is in charge of the
deletion process of the data, which is not ideal for the reasons men-
tioned above, such an offering illustrates that Facebook is willing to
provide users with data-self-destructing options.128
E. No Feasible Way to Determine if Content has Actually Been
Deleted
Even though websites subject to OUDEA would be required to
provide users with expiration technology, a risk remains that such
websites could disable the technology to keep copies for themselves.
Websites might also alter the technology in order to allow them to
keep data longer than the user permitted. Website operators may even
argue that they need the content to improve their services and better
tailor their marketing. OUDEA’s accountability requirements should
reduce non-compliance risks. OUDEA would punish websites that
copy content designated to be deleted or that keep content longer
than directed through fines and the user private right of action for
damages.129 Despite the fact that the expiration settings may not be
one hundred percent foolproof because of technical glitches and web-
sites finding ways to circumvent the technology, significant privacy
and control value stems from providing users content control through
a delete-by-default option.
service could also be used by bankers, lawyers, corporate board members, or others with
regulatory requirements.” Id.
125. TigerText does this. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 74, 76.
127. See Edwards, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. See supra Part II.A.
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F. Harm in the Loss of Valuable Information
Some critics fear that auto-expire laws would cause valuable infor-
mation to be lost forever. For example, Peter Fleischer, Google’s
global privacy counsel, has expressed the view that, “on one extreme,
government-mandated auto-expire laws would be as sensible as burn-
ing down a library every 5 years.”130 Some people emphasize the value
of a complete history of people’s interactions on the Internet.131
When a library burns down, public information that society deter-
mines is valuable, because it is worth housing in a library, are lost.
However, libraries do not store daily correspondence, photographs,
and web histories of everyday people because those are not as valuable
to society. Fleischer’s analogy does not apply to the destruction of all
user-generated information. It applies only to valuable information.
Fleischer cannot possibly believe that deleting all types of information
would lead to a loss of vast amounts of value.132 Just because the In-
ternet provides an accessible, permanent record of all interactions
does not mean that the Internet would lose substantial value if some
user-generated information expired. While OUDEA’s delete-by-de-
fault approach would retain less than complete information about a
user’s interactions on the Internet and his or her user-generated con-
tent, the loss is minimal when compared to the costs of permanent
digital memory.133
G. First Amendment Concerns
Web companies, such as Google and Facebook, argue that privacy
today is being used to justify censorship.134 Because OUDEA would
130. Fleischer, supra note 102.
131. See Matt Raymond, How Tweet It Is!: Library Acquires Entire Twitter Archive, LIBRARY OF
CONG. BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/how-tweet-it-is-library-ac-
quires-entire-twitter-archive/ (noting that, for experimental purposes, the Library of Con-
gress digitally archives every public tweet ever made since Twitter’s inception in March,
2006); Debby Bruck, Library Of Congress a Generation Twitter Time Capsule of Public Tweets,
HUBPAGES BLOG (May 2, 2012), http://debbybruck.hubpages.com/hub/Library-Of-Con-
gress-A-Generation-Twitter-Time-Capsule-of-Public-Tweets (describing the collection of
tweets).
132. Fleischer, supra note 102 (stating that “in the real world, [Fleischer] suspect[s]
that an auto-expire functionality (regardless of whether it was optional or mandatory)
would provide little real-world practical privacy protections for users, but it would result in
the lose [sic] of vast amounts of data and all the benefits that data can hold”).
133. See supra Parts I.B & II.A (OUDEA §2(b) & (d)).
134. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 102; Zach Whittaker, Google’s European Conundrum:
When Does Privacy Mean Censorship?, CNET (Mar. 1, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1009_3-57571966-83/googles-european-conundrum-when-does-privacy-mean-censorship/
(describing web companies’ (like Google, Facebook, and Twitter) positions on privacy and
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permit only users to delete self-generated content,135 censorship con-
cerns are not implicated by OUDEA to any significant extent. OUDEA
would encourage retroactive self-censorship, not censorship of others.
Through its data expiration technology mandate, OUDEA recognizes
the users’ right to be forgotten and gives control without infringing
on others’ free speech rights. Under OUDEA, deleted data would
most likely be highly personal, harmful, or embarrassing information
specific to the user. OUDEA would not hinder people’s ability to dis-
close truthful information about other individuals, such as repeating
an embarrassing comment made by a friend. Depending on the tech-
nology, OUDEA could place a burden on the re-posting party to find
another way to “copy” the material, like transcribing the comment
word-for-word. Unlike the European right to be forgotten, which
would apply to third party copies of harmful postings about users,136
OUDEA serves user control interests without affecting free speech
interests.137
H. Potential for Abuse
Some individuals are concerned about the potential for abuse of
data expiration technology.138 Permanent deletion technology may
thwart law enforcement efforts139 and decrease online security when
child pornographers, predators, and other criminals use the technol-
ogy to carry out their crimes and harmful behavior. While these are
serious concerns, the potential for misuse by a few should not pre-
clude Congress from granting users a beneficial control over their on-
line content.
the right to be forgotten as directly conflicting with free speech and as forms of
censorship).
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. Proposed Data Protection Regulation, supra note 96, at 51.
137. See supra Part II.A.
138. See, e.g., Filterthree, The Potential Dangers of Tiger Text, YOUTUBE (May 12, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xl6s63x058c&feature=related (discussing lawmakers’
concerns with TigerText technology and the associated risks of abuse by potential and past
criminals).
139. See Gerry Smith, Wickr Security App Makes Messages and Photos Self-Destruct, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/wickr-secur-
ity-app-messages-self-destruct_n_1631675.html (describing that the mobile phone
application, Wickr, “uses technology to ensure that messages cannot be recovered, not
even by law enforcement officers, who can acquire subpoenas to compel wireless providers
or Internet service providers to turn over suspects’ data as evidence”).
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I. Too Cumbersome for Users
Some may argue that users will find it too difficult to decide what
information they should delete and when. It may also be difficult to
know what information users will want to have available at a future
date. Even if deletion time frames are tentative, readjusting takes
some effort and the time costs of “re-thinking” or “re-planning” may
add up so that users might find making adjustments inconvenient to
them and ignore the delete function altogether. While a multitude of
factors140 will affect any one decision pertaining to a piece of content,
this does not invalidate the need for more user control. Even though
some users may never employ the expiration technology that OUDEA
would require websites to provide,141 other users may find the control
feasible, helpful, and easy to apply to the content they generate on-
line.142 The benefits that OUDEA would provide to users—through
expiration settings, notice, reporting, sanctions, and redress—are in-
valuable.143 Just because some might not take advantage of OUDEA’s
benefits does not mean that they should not be available to those who
would.
IV. Hurdles to OUDEA’s Passage—Politics and Powerful
Lobbyists
Some may oppose OUDEA’s delete-by-default approach by rais-
ing post-9/11 national security and terrorism threat concerns.144 They
may argue that social networks should permanently preserve all user-
generated content, especially because “[a]bout 90 [percent] of organ-
ized terrorism on the [I]nternet is being carried out through social
media.”145
140. See supra note 113 (listing factors that users will consider when deciding whether
to delete a piece of content).
141. See supra Part II.A.
142. Services already exist which allow Internet users to set similar settings for content
they generate online. See Gilbert, supra note 91 (describing Burn Note self-deleting messag-
ing service).
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See G.F., supra note 118 (noting that the justice department and security agencies
are concerned that such data destruction tools and anonymous and secure communication
mediums “might be useful to criminals and or terrorists”).
145. Terrorist Groups Recruiting Through Social Media, Facebook, Twitter Also Used to Gather
Intelligence, CBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/
01/10/tech-terrorist-social-media.html; see also Emil Protalinski, After Denouncing SOPA and
PIPA, How Can Facebook Support CISPA?, ZDNET (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/
blog/facebook/after-denouncing-sopa-and-pipa-how-can-facebook-support-cispa/11700
(describing Facebook’s support for the proposed bill called “Cyber Intelligence Sharing
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Social network operators appeal to Congress to pass laws that fur-
ther their interests.146 For example, Facebook established a political
action committee in 2011 and reported giving $193,000 to lawmakers
during that year.147 Facebook spent a record $960,000 on lobbying
during the second quarter of 2012.148 The more politicians and
lawmakers rely on social media, the more influence social network
companies may have on the passage of laws like OUDEA. Given in-
creased lobbying by social networks and Internet giants149 and the
amount of money they spend to influence lawmakers on specific issues
that affect their businesses and profitability,150 such parties would
likely mount significant opposition to OUDEA if they viewed it as a
threat to their interests. However, because Facebook already offers its
users data-destruction services through its mobile phone application
Facebook Poke,151 it is possible that, at least from Facebook, OUDEA
would face little resistance.
Congress may also hesitate to pass OUDEA-type legislation if web-
sites like Facebook and Twitter generate user opposition. If legislation
like OUDEA lacks user support or if users openly protest against it,
lawmakers may not support its passage.152
and Protection Act [(CISPA)], where provisions of the bill would allow private companies
to voluntarily share user information and data with the U.S. government and vice versa if
the information is relevant to a “cyber threat”); CISPA, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3523rfs/pdf/BILLS-112hr3523rfs.
pdf.
146. Cecilia Kang, Web Giants Launch Lobbying Group, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/web-giants-launch-lobbying-group/
2012/09/19/8cbb0bfc-0297-11e2-91e7-2962c74e7738_story.html.
147. David Saleh Rauf, Facebook Lobbying Sets Record in Q2, POLITICO (July 7, 2012),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78804.html.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 146 (describing a new lobbying association launched by
Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Yahoo “to counter efforts by federal regulators to saddle
their industry with new rules”).
150. Id.
151. See supra note 124.
152. The Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”), the Protect IP Act (“PIPA”), and the Janu-
ary 18, 2012 protests illustrate how vocal opposition to legislation that may threaten social
networks’ interests can affect political support for legislation passage. Before January 18,
2012, 48 members of the Senate and 32 members of the House supported the bills, while
six members of the Senate and 25 members of the House opposed them. After January 18,
2012, Senate support decreased by eleven and House support by six, where opposition
increased in the Senate by sixteen and by 70 in the House. While SOPA and PIPA were
viewed as threats to individual privacy and freedom on the web, some could view data-
destruction in a similarly threatening way. Stop SOPA: How People and Social Media Changed
Lawmakers’ Minds (INFOGRAPHIC), HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2012/01/20/stop-sopa-congress-changed-their-mind-on-sopa_n_
1219759.html.
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Politicians and lawmakers have become Internet users as it be-
comes the primary means of communicating with their constitu-
ents.153 They generate content on the Internet and social networks to
strengthen their campaigns,154 agendas, and to increase political com-
munications. Websites like Facebook and Twitter are valuable commu-
nication and advertising channels for political campaigns.155 As one
article noted, “[m]embers of Congress are using Facebook in differ-
ent ways—from buying ads to conducting town halls—as a vehicle to
boost engagement with constituents and expand their support on-
line.”156 Thus, as users themselves, Congressmen and women may sup-
port OUDEA because they post content to the Internet, which may
come back to haunt them later.157
Conclusion
Users should demand increased control over their user-generated
content and challenge the permanent digital memory norm. Time for
change is ripe. Today, users’ opinions are widely broadcasted through
153. See, e.g., United States President Barack Obama’s Facebook Page, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/barackobama (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); New York City Mayor Mike
Bloomberg’s Facebook Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mikebloomberg (last vis-
ited Apr. 6, 2013); California Senator Dianne Feinstein’s Facebook Page, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/SenatorFeinstein (last visited Apr. 6, 2013); Washington State Senator
Maria Cantwell’s Twitter Page, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/CantwellPress (last visited Apr.
6, 2013); California Governor Jerry Brown’s Twitter Page, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Jer-
ryBrownGov (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
154. See, e.g., Matthew Fraser & Soumitra Dutta, Barack Obama and the Facebook Election,
U.S. NEWS (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/11/19/ba-
rack-obama-and-the-facebook-election (describing President Barack Obama’s use of social
networking sites to connect directly with voters).
155. Id.
156. Jennifer Moire, Update: Facebook Spent a Record $1.35 Million Lobbying During 2011,
ALLFACEBOOK (Jan. 21, 2012, 8:13 PM), http://allfacebook.com/facebook-spent-record-1-
35-million-lobbying-2011_b74619.
157. See, e.g., Bianca Bosker, The Twitter Typo That Exposed Anthony Weiner, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/anthony-weiner-twit-
ter-dm_n_872590.html (discussing Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY)’s accidental posting of a
lewd picture to Twitter, which caused him to resign). Three house staffers for Democratic
Congressman Rick Larsen, of Washington State’s second district, were fired after months
of tweets that described on-the-job drinking and public insults of Congressman Larsen.
Some of the tweets read: “Dear taxpayers—I hope you don’t mind that I’m watching You-
Tube clips of Nirvana at my government job. Thanks, you’re the best.”; “My coworker just
took a shot of Jack crouching behind my desk. We have unabashedly given up on just
about all things work related.”; and “I really like DC, but I could have used another day
away. The silver lining is that I don’t have to see my idiot boss.” Tweets from Congressional
Staffers Describe On-Job Drinking in Office of Congressman Larsen, NW DAILY MARKER (Dec. 8,
2011), http://www.nwdailymarker.com/2011/12/tweets-from-congressional-staffers-de-
scribe-on-job-drinking-in-office-of-congressman-larsen/.
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various social media and Internet-news forums158 and traditional me-
dia outlets.159 These demands gain the attention of websites,160 as well
as others involved in social media communities.161 Websites take user
input seriously162 and users have the potential to change a website’s
position on its terms of service and offerings.163 Given this ability,
users must express concern for increased control over their content
through discussions on blogs and social media forums. User demands
should be heard off the Internet as well by urging lawmakers to pass a
law solidifying these demands. Users should also call on privacy advo-
cate groups for support.164 Users should not be content with the pre-
sent take-it-or-leave-it situation. User support for legislation, such as
OUDEA, would provide users with more control over their data, in-
cluding determining how long their content should exist on the In-
ternet. It is imperative that users pressure lawmakers to support
OUDEA-type legislation. Congress must recognize that, at present,
users have inadequate bargaining power to effect change from these
large Internet companies, and therefore, legislative backing is
158. See, e.g., User Backlash Proves to be a Challenge for Facebook, BUS. STANDARD (Apr. 11,
2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/technology/user-backlash-proves-to-be-
a-challenge-for-facebook-11301040v]0018_1.html [hereinafter User Backlash] (noting that
user backlash and opposition creates obstacles for Facebook’s sales growth).
159. See, e.g., Instagram Takes Back Policy Change, Says Users’ Photos Won’t Appear in Ads,
FOX NEWS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/12/18/instagram-takes-
back-policy-change-says-users-photos-wont-appear-in-ads/ (reporting that Instagram’s
terms of service change, which would allow the company to use its users’ photographs in
advertisements, upset users).
160. See Kevin Systtom, Thank you, and We’re Listening, INSTAGRAM BLOG, http://blog.
instagram.com/post/38252135408/thank-you-and-were-listening (last visited Apr. 7 2013).
161. See Jenna Wortham, Facebook Responds to Anger Over Proposed Instagram Changes, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/technology/facebook-re-
sponds-to-anger-over-proposed-instagram-changes.html (explaining that user outrage and
concerns over Instagram terms of service changes surfaced on social media forums like
Twitter and Instagram).
162. See Systtom, supra note 160.
163. See Wortham, supra note 161 (noting that Instagram would change terms of ser-
vice because of user concerns); Francis Bea, Instagram Fights Back, Releases Performance Stats
for the First Time, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-me-
dia/instagram-fights-back-releases-performance-stats-for-the-first-time/ (“The Internet re-
acted and revolted in dismay when Instagram’s terms and conditions suggested that its
monetization scheme included owning the rights to its user’s content and allow brands and
advertisers access to it. Users shut down their accounts and celebrities fled. The uproar
finally compelled Instagram to revert back to backpedal a bit [sic]. . . .”).
164. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER (EPIC), http://epic.org/pri-
vacy/privacy_resources_faq.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDA-
TION (EFF), https://www.eff.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
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essential. This Comment encourages users to increase awareness of
the need, and their desire, to change the permanency default by de-
manding that Congress enact legislation like OUDEA.
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